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Abstract
In the context of multi-agent systems (MAS), an Agent Coordination Context (ACC) is an abstraction provided by the
infrastructure to each agent entering a MAS, aimed at enabling and controlling all the interactions of the agent with its environment.
The notion of ACC features some key properties that help abating system complexity, that is, (i) it works as both a coordination
and a security abstraction, (ii) it covers the engineering process from design to deployment, and (iii) it comes equipped with a
clear formalisation, thus easing predictability of the MAS behaviour. In particular, in this paper we exploit typical process algebra
techniques to define the syntax and semantics of a language for ACC specification, describing patterns of interaction protocols
allowed to the agent. This language is shown to be useful to specify and enact integrated policies for security and coordination in
MAS.
c© 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
The need for new theoretical and practical tools to harness complexity grows along with the always increasing
complicatedness of artificial systems. On the one hand, agent-oriented models and technologies are proposed as
one of the most promising frameworks for the engineering of complex software systems [1]. On the other hand,
infrastructures are more and more playing a key role in the engineering of complex artificial systems, by providing
cheap and systematic solutions to critical problems, and allowing the interplay between system components to be
suitably enabled and governed. In particular, according to [2], multi-agent system (MAS) infrastructures are the most
natural place where to embed abstractions able to govern, control, and secure the interactions of an agent with its
environment — with other agents in the MAS as well as with MAS services and resources.
Along this line, the contribution of this paper is twofold. In the first place, we discuss the notion of Agent
Coordination Context (ACC) [3] as a first-class abstraction provided at run-time by a MAS infrastructure. When
an agent aims at entering a MAS, an ACC is negotiated between the agent and the supporting MAS infrastructure, and
is then associated to the agent itself: from then on, the ACC governs all the agent interactions within the MAS until
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the agent quits the system. An ACC is basically an organisational abstraction which promotes a unified view of both
security and coordination — it provides agents with a disciplined view and access to the environment. In the second
place, we focus on the formal specification of ACCs, by showing how existing process algebra techniques can be used
to provide a clean and simple formal description of an ACC behaviour. This is accomplished by defining the syntax
and semantics of a language for specifying the behaviour of ACCs, resembling standard algebras like CCS [4] and
ACP [5]. Such a language, however, does not merely work as a specification tool: in fact, it is also straightforwardly
used by the infrastructure to enforce the ACC behaviour at run-time, by defining and enacting the admissible policies
for agent interaction. In particular, we adopt a generalised notion of action and substitution, and show how it can be
uniformly used to address two seemingly different issues: the encoding of value-passing mechanisms as in standard
approaches (useful to model information flow between an agent and its environment), and the representation of the
patterns of actions allowed to an agent through an ACC at a given time (useful to flexibly express agent protocols).
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the main issues concerning coordination
and security in MASs, and outlining an organisational approach to their integration. Section 3 introduces the ACC
notion, its impact on agent run-time behaviour, its ability to enforce security policies concerning access control, and
finally its properties as a general abstraction for taming complexity in MAS design. Section 4 presents our formal
framework, where the ACC algebra is introduced and seen as the main ingredient of an operational semantics for the
behaviour of agents in MAS. Several examples are discussed to show how our notions of actions and substitution
affect the relationship between agent behaviour and ACC specification. In Section 5 we widen our formal framework
capturing a whole MAS behaviour, that is, explicitly representing an agent environment in terms of other agents and
coordination media. Finally, Section 6 concludes providing final remarks.
2. Coordination and security as a duality in MAS
2.1. Coordination in MAS
Coordination is one of the key issues in the modelling and engineering of complex systems. As such, it has been
the subject of several investigations within a multiplicity of different research areas; correspondingly, it has been
differently conceived and defined (comprehensive surveys can be found in [6–8]). Generally speaking, coordination
can be defined as the management, or government of interaction–interaction among the components of a system,
whichever the components, whichever the system. Among the many approaches to coordination that this definition
generalises, particularly relevant here are the many coordination language and models [9] such as the LINDA-based
[10] coordination infrastructures JavaSpaces [11] and TSpaces [12], channel-based models such as Manifold [13]
and ρω [14], MAS infrastructures such as TuCSoN [15] and MARS [16]. There, coordination is charged upon
specialised abstractions (the coordination media), such as tuple spaces or channels, that both enable and rule the
interaction between system components.
In the context of MAS, in particular, there are two useful ways of looking at the space of interaction: from the agent
viewpoint and from the viewpoint of an external observer not directly involved in the interaction. According to [17,
18], they are called, respectively, subjective and objective viewpoints over coordination. In the former case, the acts
of an agent that coordinates within a MAS are driven by its own perception and understanding of the other agents’
behaviour, capabilities and goals, as well as of the environment state and dynamics. This is typical of the coordination
in MAS approaches rooted in Distributed Artificial Intelligence (DAI). In the latter, coordination is driven by some
kind of media external to the agents, enabling and mediating their interaction, and embodying and enforcing the
coordination laws established by the system engineers. In this case, infrastructures provide first-class abstractions to
support coordination as a service [19], making it possible for the individual agents to focus on their own tasks and
not to be burdened by the overall coordination activities. Objective coordination is typically adopted by coordination
approaches in MAS rooted in Software Engineering (SE). The first approach better suits systems whose components
exhibit a high degree of autonomy (intelligent agents being the most obvious example), whereas the second fits well
application scenarios involving a finer component granularity (as typical in the case of mobile agents).
The need to overcome such a dualism is apparent when dealing with complex application domains – e.g.
distributed workflow management systems – where agent-oriented engineering would benefit from both the
autonomy/intelligence of individual agents and the availability of coordination infrastructure supporting agent
social activities [17]. Accordingly, some hybrid approaches can be recognised in MAS literature, providing some
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characteristics of both subjective and objective coordination: notable examples are environment-based coordination
approaches [20] and team-oriented coordination frameworks [21]. Also, some investigations are ongoing for fruitfully
exploiting both kind of approaches in the same scenarios: an example can be found in [22], where Activity Theory
was proposed as a unitary and coherent conceptual framework for both approaches to agent coordination.
2.2. Security in MAS
Security in MAS deals with aspects that are similar to those found in the more traditional scenario of (distributed)
information systems. However, very often the peculiarity of agent-based systems calls for rather new solutions.
Security issues can be divided into three different sorts: authentication, authorisation (or access control), and
privacy. Firstly, agents – as autonomous entities with an identity – can be requested to authenticate themselves in
order to take part to a MAS. Secondly, and clearly depending on the outcomes of authentication, each agent is given a
certain level of authorisation to access the resources in the MAS and to interact with other agents. Finally, information
exchanged by the agent within a MAS can be possibly encrypted, in order to protect agent privacy. The framework
presented in this paper mostly deals with the second aspect: the first is conceptually framed and assumed to be
tackled through standard models and techniques (such PKI infrastructures, certification authorities), whereas the third
is simply neglected here.
Among the others, agent autonomy and MAS openness are the two basic features that make the engineering of
security issues particularly challenging. On the one hand, models and infrastructures needs to prescriptively specify
and enact social norms and security policies, but without a direct and too tight control on the behaviour of the
individual agent, so as not to hamper its autonomy. For instance, rather than preventing a malicious or fallacious agent
behaviour, care could be taken that it does not negatively impact on the rest of the MAS. On the other hand, MAS
are typically characterised by a high degree of heterogeneity and dynamism: norms and policies must be enforced
in dynamic organisation structures, where (heterogeneous) agents enter and leave the organisation at run-time. Thus,
security policies cannot be thought as statically defined once and for all at design-time, but they could be dynamically
adapted to emerging needs, up until reaching self-organisation scenarios.
2.3. Unifying coordination and security through organisation
It is clear then that security and coordination are strictly related issues, being both focused on the government of
interactions inside a system, however according to two different (dual) viewpoints: normative for security, constructive
for coordination [23]. Whereas security focuses on preventing undesired/incorrect system behaviours, which may
result in problems like denial of services or unauthorised access to resources, coordination is concerned with enabling
desirable/correct system behaviours, typically the meaningful, goal-directed interaction between different system
components. As a result, not only would coordination and security benefit by being modelled and expressed within a
common conceptual framework, but it is also seemingly clear that these two aspects cannot any longer be treated
separately in the engineering of complex systems — given that they both deal with handling the dynamics of
interaction within systems.
If coordination and security are dual aspects, organisation’s issues strictly concern and affect both of them. On
the one hand, in organisation models and theories the notion of role has been recently adopted — see e.g. Role-
Based Access Control Models (RBAC) and their extension [24]. There, roles and inter-role/agent-role relationships
are the semantic constructs on top of which security policies are designed and enacted, reusing and extending basic
authentication and authorisation frameworks. On the other hand, organisational abstractions have been introduced in
the context of MAS coordination at different levels, in particular for reducing the complexity of the agent interaction
space [25]. For instance, interaction protocols and conversations adopted for agent coordination through high level
ACLs (agent communication languages) such as FIPA or KQML are typically described using the concept of role and
inter-role relationships [26]. Also, organisational models based on roles are nowadays widely adopted for agent-based
software engineering as well, though they simply extend approaches rooted in object-oriented software engineering,
providing means for the analysis and design of MAS [27,28]. So, the definition of organisation structures and rules
makes it possible to statically frame the agent interaction space, focusing on abstract structures such as roles, societies
or group structures [29].
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2.4. Towards a framework for MAS
Summing up, it is clear that the multiple aspects related to the security issue in MAS can be tackled in a coherent
and satisfactory framework only by covering the whole spectrum that ranges from organisation – with issues related to
system structures and relations among the components – to coordination – with issues related to collective processes.
Correspondingly, facing modelling and engineering of security within this range increases system conceptual integrity
by promoting the reuse of abstractions such as roles, permissions, and societies – which have already proved to be
effective in the context of organisation and coordination – in order to enforce and manage complex and dynamic
security policies.
In principle, a unifying framework would make it possible to reformulate the security issues according to a
perspective which also accounts for coordination and organisation. Then, given a role-based organisational context,
we can frame security issues identifying two basic stages:
• Joining an organisation—Here security policies establish who can enter the organisation, and which roles can be
assumed by the individual agents. Typically these aspects requires both traditional models used for authentication,
and suitable infrastructures to enact the constrains on role admission and activation.
• Playing inside an organisation — Here security policies concern authorisation, and rule agent access to the
resources and services provided by the organisational context, as well as inter-agent communication according
to specific interaction protocols.
Issues concerning agent privacy and information protection can be considered as orthogonal to the two stages
above, and could apply to both stages — for instance, in order to protect inter-agent communication or agent
interaction with organisation resources.
The Agent Coordination Context abstraction proposed in this paper can then be adopted to model and engineer
coordination, security and organisation issues in a coherent manner, integrating them all in the same conceptual
framework.
3. Agent Coordination Contexts
3.1. The ACC design-/run-time abstraction
The notion of Agent Coordination Context (ACC) has been introduced in [3] so as to model issues concerning
MAS organisation in an integrated way with coordination and security issues.
An ACC is meant to represent the conceptual boundary between the agent and the environment, encapsulating the
agent interface toward the environment. As an interface, the ACC both (i) works as a model for the agent environment,
and (ii) enables and rules the interactions between the agent and the environment. The ACC models the presence of an
agent within an organisation, by defining the agent admissible actions (including perception) to organisation resources
and its admissible communications toward the other agents in the MAS. Thus, an ACC works both as a specification
tool for the rules governing agent interaction, and as a means to enact such rules — that is, to physically let admissible
agent actions toward the environment. Moreover, the ACC is meant to store such rules, and make them available
for agent run-time inspection and, possibly, meta-level reasoning over the MAS state and dynamics. A graphical
representation of the ACC notion is depicted in Fig. 1.
In order to provide the reader with a better intuition of the ACC concept, we rely on the example where the ACC is
seen as a control room for the agent [3]. According to this metaphor, an agent entering a new environment is assigned
its own control room, which is the only means to perceive the environment and to interact with it. The control room
offers the agent a set of admissible inputs (lights, screens, . . . ), and admissible outputs (buttons, cameras, . . . ). The
control room configuration – that is, the ACC specific behaviour – defines how many input and output devices are
available to an agent, of what sort, and for how much time. On the other hand, the control room (so, the ACC) is the
only way the agent is perceived by its surrounding environment, that is, by the rest of the system.
When exploited in the context of coordination infrastructures, an ACC works by governing agent interactions with
coordination media, which are expressed in terms of primitives of the underlying coordination model. A notable
example of technology supporting this notion is TuCSoN [15], where – as studied in [30] – an ACC governs
interaction with tuple centres, according to the ReSpecT coordination model [31]. In the case of MAS based on
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Fig. 1. The agent coordination context abstraction.
direct communication models, instead, such as KQML or FIPA ACL, the ACC works by ruling agent communicative
actions and conversations. More generally, the ACC can be used to enable and rule agent actions and perceptions,
independently of their kind and their targets/sources — e.g. whether they are communications to other agents or
access to environmental resources.
Two basic stages characterise the lifetime of an ACC: ACC negotiation and ACC use. In order to actively take part
to a MAS, to access its resources as well as to interact with other agents, an agent must first negotiate an ACC through
the basic services provided by the infrastructure. Typically, in this stage the agent specifies the structure (society,
group) that it aims at joining, and the role(s) it aims at playing. In the case of a successful negotiation – i.e. the agent
request is compatible with the rules defined inside the organisation – a properly configured ACC is released to the
agent. From then on, the agent is an active part of the society/group, and can use the ACC to interact within the
environment according to the organisational rules defined in the ACC configuration.
An ACC represents a contract between the agent using it and the organisation where the agent is playing through
the ACC. Rules concerning this contract are not meant to change so frequently: a change – due to updates in the
security/organisation policy concerning the roles the ACC is representing – means breaking the contract. In that case
the ACC owned by the agent is no longer valid (any trial to execute an operation is rejected), and the agent must
re-negotiate a valid ACC.
An ACC can be dynamically updated by activating/deactivating roles on it: the request can be accepted or rejected
according to the rules defined – at run-time – by the organisation. If the request is accepted, the ACC space of
admissible actions is updated accordingly.
With respect to the dualism between subjective and objective coordination in MAS, in some sense an ACC acts as
the conceptual bridge between the two viewpoints, since it specifies and constrains the space of actions and perceptions
that are objectively available to a specific agent (role), and makes it available to the subjective choice of the agent.
In the case of a coordination infrastructure such as TuCSoN, the ACC completes the coordination tools that an
engineer needs in order to govern the agent interaction space. In particular, whereas laws and policies meant to
manage the interaction among an ensemble of agents must be placed in coordination media, those meant to rule the
individual actions and perceptions with respect to the ensemble must be placed in the ACC. Moreover, it is worth
remarking that the ACC is a local abstraction, containing and managing information related only to the interaction
state of the specific agent owning it. On the other hand, a coordination medium typically manages information about
the interaction, communication and coordination state of the ensemble of agents using it.
3.2. Modelling and enacting security policies
When mapping security upon ACCs, authentication and authorisation can be mapped directly on the two basic
stages that concern the life-cycle of an ACC, i.e. ACC negotiation and run-time.
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Security policies concerning the first stage – i.e. agent entrance into the MAS – rules the ACC negotiation, relying
on constraints specified as agent-role and inter-role relationships. Such policies determine whether an agent can join
the society, based on the agent identity – authentication is typically required here – and on the roles that the agent is
possibly already playing within the organisation. This makes it possible to enforce basic security principles such as
(static and dynamic) separation of duties [32].
Security issues concerning the second stage – i.e. agent actions and interaction inside the organisation – are enacted
in the ACC run-time, where the ACC governs at execution time agent communication and access to the organisation
resources according to the permissions granted to the agent role(s). Such permissions are expressed in terms of the
patterns of actions and interaction protocols that an agent is allowed to perform within the MAS. For instance, in the
very case of coordinated systems that we here focus on, permissions are expressed in terms of admissible coordination
primitives on the coordination media provided by the infrastructure.
Both ACC negotiation and run-time stages deal with crucial security issues. However, in the formal framework
developed in this paper we focus on aspects related to the ACC run-time stage, which include the policies by which an
ACC controls, constraints, filters – in one word, secures – the agent interaction within the organisation. Indeed, these
aspects are related to the dynamics issues typically raising from the relationship between security and coordination,
whereas the negotiation phase – dealing with roles and their interplay – is mostly concerned with static security aspects
of the organisation, such as authentication.
Admissible agent actions are not defined statically, in general, but may dynamically depend on a number of factors
such as agent interaction history, time constraints, general system status and behaviour, and many others. For instance,
the capability of specifying the set of admissible actions by virtue of the action history can be used to bound agent
behaviour to some given interaction protocol, defined according to the agent role. A well-known example in the MAS
context is the Contract Net Protocol [33]: through suitably configured ACCs it is possible to constrain the interactive
behaviour of agents to follow any of the possible action sequences established for the auctioneer and bidder roles
involved in the protocol. This capability is nearly mandatory for MAS models and infrastructures, especially in those
contexts where the enforcement of interaction protocols and social norms is strictly required, such as in electronic
institution contexts [34].
4. A formal model for Agent Coordination Contexts
In this section, we present a formal foundation to the notion of ACC. The ACC is here conceptually modelled as
a wrapper for the agent enabling the execution of some actions: therefore, we do not model for simplicity any issue
related to timing properties and constraints. Also, our framework intentionally abstracts away from the details of the
specific MAS infrastructure, so as to be general enough to support ACC application to many different scenarios.
The presentation of the formal model is incremental. We first characterise agents as abstractions interacting with
their environment, focusing on formal aspects of agent actions and substitutions used to handle value-passing. Then,
the model is extended to deal with ACCs, so that agent interactions with the environment actually occur only as far as
they are allowed by the ACC: from this point of view, the ACC behaviour is represented in its filtering, controlling and
enabling nature. In particular, the generalised notions of action and substitution introduced is used here to uniformly
deal with value-passing as well as action patterns — either executed by an agent or filtered by the ACC.
Several options were available for a language to describe an ACC security and coordination policy. Our choice
was not to invent a new language, but rather to exploit the well-known syntax and semantics of existing concurrent
languages (such as CCS [4] and ACP [5]) by adapting them to the ACC expressive needs. Most notably, process
algebras techniques are here applied not only to traditional contexts such as specification and verification, but also for
enactment: the security policies of an ACC are meant to be enforced at run-time by the MAS infrastructure, stored in
the ACC run-time, and explicitly represented through the language defined in the following.1
4.1. Agent interaction with the environment
Our first step is to provide quite an abstract model of agent behaviour. As far as interaction with the environment
and security by access control are concerned, an agent can be merely represented as a purely interacting entity,
1 The term “enactment” is often used in the precess algebra context to identify execution of specifications. The acceptation we use here is more
refined, as it amounts to the run-time management needed to ensure an agent to act conformingly to an interaction protocol.
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abstracting away from the architecture and dynamics of the agent internal machinery. In general, agent actions can be
of different nature, depending on the specific MAS infrastructure, the agent model, and the environment nature: they
can be communication actions between agents (such as speech acts [35]), actions executed over physical resources,
perceptions of the outcomes of such executions (including failures), or perceptions of some environment changes.
To abstract away from all these details, paving the way to the introduction of a general model of ACC, we define a
generalised form of interaction.
Any form of agent interaction is modelled as the execution of an action over the environment, possibly along with
the perception of its outcomes. In general, actions are structured terms, possibly carrying information such as specific
data about the interaction, the environment abstraction involved in the interaction, and the like. For an action to be
executed it should be allowed by the environment: in this case its execution can happen that is atomic and yields a
substitution to the agent. In this case, a substitution models an information flow from the environment to the agent,
used to represent perception of an action outcomes or an environment change. This information can be used by the
agent to refine and adapt both its state and its future behaviour.
Formally, the concept of substitution is captured here by defining the structure called action substitution system.
This is a tuple 〈A,Σ , F, FG〉, where A is a set of terms denoting actions, Σ ⊆ A 7→ A is a set of partial functions
from A to A representing substitutions, F ⊆ A × Σ is a compatibility relation characterising action/substitution pairs
allowed by the environment structure, and FG ⊆ A × A is a correspondence (binary) relation over actions, stating
when two actions synchronise one with each other. An action a ∈ A is substituted by σ ∈ Σ to the new action σ(a),
also denoted by σa. Notice that a substitution system is completely specified once the MAS infrastructure supporting
agent–environment interaction is identified.
Upon a substitution system, we then define the interactive behaviour of an agent in terms of an operational
semantics. In particular, a process executing a sequence of actions is modelled using the standard process-algebraic
syntax
P, Q ::= 0 | a.P | P + Q
where a.P denotes the agent executing action a and then behaving like P , and P + Q is the agent executing
either behaviour P or Q — by a so-called non-deterministic choice. For the choice operator +, commutativity and
associativity are supposed. An element P (or Q) is called here a process, and represents the interaction state of an
agent — and is therefore also called agent state, given the purely interactive nature of agents here. Let P be the set of
agent states.
The reader should notice that the choice of excluding standard process-algebraic constructs such as infinite
behaviours (e.g. by a replication operator) and parallel composition plays here no significant role. Our approach mostly
abstracts away from internal details of agents, thus we find it useful to select only those few constructs impacting on
ACC design: action execution and continuation – to describe the effect of value-passing on an agent future behaviour
– and multiple interaction histories (by choice) – to easily model allowed/disallowed actions without an explicit notion
of deadlock.
The interactive behaviour of an agent within an environment is then described through an operational semantics
to the above language. The informal intuition behind this semantics is that at a given time, the environment may
allow the agent to execute an action a through a substitution σ : this means that the agent intends to execute
a, but only the refined action σ(a) has been (or could be) actually executed; moreover, σ is applied to the
continuation, meaning that the agent becomes aware of the outcome of executing a. However, as shown in the
operational semantics below, relation F is used to model the case where the environment structurally prevents
certain pairs action/substitution, for them being incoherent with respect to the underlying MAS infrastructure. Hence,
relation F is used so that a F σ holds if and only if the environment is compatible with the execution of action
a involving substitution σ . Thus in our model, execution of action a never yields substitution σ if it happens
that a6 F σ .
Accordingly, formal operational semantics of agent behaviour is defined in terms of a standard labelled transition
system 〈P,−→P, F〉, where labels are of the kind a : σ and −→P⊆ P × F × P . In particular, notation P a:σ−−→P P ′,
which is a shorthand for 〈P, a, σ, P ′〉 ∈−→P, means that the agent in state P can perform action a, which is allowed
by the environment through substitution σ (and so that a F σ hold ), and which makes the agent state moving to P ′.
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Transition relation −→P is defined as the smallest relation satisfying the rules2:
a.P
a:σ−−→P σ P
P
a:σ−−→P P ′
P + Q a:σ−−→P P ′
.
The rule on the right is the standard rule for the choice operator: only one of two (or several) alternatives is allowed to
carry on, and the decision is taken as one action is executed. The rule on the left states that an action a is executed only
if the involved substitution σ is compatible with the environment structure (in the sense of relation F): consequently
σ is applied to the agent continuation. We overload the meaning of a substitution σ , denoting with σ P the syntactical
substitution σ applied to all actions occurring in process P , recursively defined as:
σ0 , 0 σ(a.P) , σa.σ P σ(P + Q) , σ P + σQ.
The notion of action correspondence is exploited in Section 5, for it involves the direct interaction between two
agents.
4.2. Examples
Whereas the examples of agent interactions – and the related substitution mechanisms – used in this paper are
quite intuitive, we find it useful to discuss here the general validity of our model, and its application to common cases.
To this end, we show how standard value-passing and LINDA-style coordination primitives can be encoded into our
substitution system, for them being archetypal cases of the direct and indirect interaction schemata.
Value-passing
As a first example, we show how our notion of agent interaction featuring substitutions is able to encode value-
passing, as is used e.g. in CCS process algebra.
In CCS, processes interact with the environment through channels identified by a name n. They can either (i) send
a specific value !n(u), e.g. sending value 3 to channel n by action !n(3), or (ii) receiving a specific value ?n(u), e.g.
receiving value 3 from channel n by action ?n(3), or (iii) receiving any value, by action ?n(v) a process receives a
value u from channel n and binds variable v to u. Thus, to model this kind of interaction we let meta-variable n range
over channel names, u over values (without sort), v over variables, w over both values and variables, and generally
denote actions avp ∈ Avp by the syntax:
avp ::= !n(w) | ?n(w).
Notice that we included also the case !n(v) in the syntax, since a process may syntactically feature this action
before it gets actually substituted by the execution of another action. We denote by {v/u} the function substituting
any occurrence of variable v with value u on actions in Avp. Thus, the allowed substitutions σ vp ∈ Σ vp for standard
value-passing include, other than the identity, also single-variable substitutions to value, that is:
Σ vp = I ∪
⋃
v,u
{v/u}.
In CCS, however, processes never send variables and always receive values: this aspect is a structural property of
interactions which is not only related to the substitution mechanism, but it is rather influenced by the structure of the
environment. We take into account this issue by virtue of the F relation, which is defined as the smallest satisfying the
rules:
!n(u) F I ?n(u) F I ?n(v) F {v/u}.
Namely, sending or receiving a specific value is always accepted and involves the identity substitution; also, receiving
a generic value is accepted only as far as the corresponding variable gets bound by the involved substitution.
2 As standard in process algebras, by smallest here we mean that the four elements 〈P, a, σ, P ′〉 are in the relation P a:σ−−→P P ′ if and only if
this can be derived by the provided rules [36].
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LINDA coordination primitives
As a second example we move toward interaction in coordination models, and analyse the case of processes
interacting with an environment made of LINDA-like tuple spaces. We let x range over tuples, which are terms of
the kind t (w1, . . . , wk), built by applying values (u) or variables (v) to tuple names (t) – each with its own arity – id
range over tuple space identifiers, and denote actions al ∈ Al by the syntax:
pi ::= in | rd
al ::= pi(id, x) | out (id, x).
By action rd(id, x) an agent reads from tuple space id any tuple that matches the template (i.e., tuple with variables) x ,
in(id, x) removes one such tuple, and out (id, x) inserts the tuple x without variables in the tuple space id. We naturally
extend the notation for variable substitution by writing {v1/u1, . . . vk/uk} for a multiple substitution of variables with
values, and write bound(x)when tuple x has no variables. Similarly to the case of value-passing, allowed substitutions
σ l ∈ Σ l are defined as:
Σ l = I ∪
⋃
v j ,u j
{v1/u1, . . . , vk/uk}.
Relation F is defined by the two rules:
bound(x)
out (id, x) F I
bound({v1/u1, . . . , vk/uk}(pi(id, x)))
pi(id, x) F {v1/u1, . . . , vk/uk}
.
Namely, only tuples without variables can be inserted into a tuple space, and reading/removing a tuple yields a
substitution binding all the variables of the specified template.
4.3. The Agent Coordination Contexts algebra
In the framework developed so far, the interaction between an agent and the environment is direct and unregulated:
when an agent intends to execute an action that is allowed by the environment, this is simply executed, involving a
substitution. This scenario endorses the idea that all the burden of controlling and ruling agent interactions is to be
charged upon the entities living in the environment, whether they are physical resources, legacy software components,
information sources, other agents, and so on. In this section we add the notion of ACC to this basic framework, which
is in fact meant to wrap the agent and rule its interactions with the environment. In particular, we provide a means to
specify and enact access control policies via ACCs.
Instead of defining a brand-new language for ACC specification, we here rely on standard language features
typically exploited in concurrency theory to describe interactive behaviours, namely in process algebras such as CCS
[4] and ACP [5]. This does not only open to the possibility of reusing existing methodologies for the verification of
properties, but generally allows us to inherit the conceptual framework of process algebras, facilitating the task of
reasoning about coordination and security properties. Most notably, we take advantage of the fact that the operational
semantics of process algebras can be directly interpreted as the interactive behaviour of a software component. Dually,
our choice amounts to exploiting process algebras not only for the specification/design of a system, but also as a run-
time tool to enact security and coordination policies by virtue of a MAS infrastructure.
In particular, our idea is to make an ACC specification be operational, i.e., coinciding with the representation of
the ACC state itself, which evolves as interactions occur. We let meta-variables C and D range over the set C of states
for an ACC, which we also call contexts, defined by the algebra with syntax:
C, D ::= 0 | a | C + D | (C || D) | C; D | D.
0 is the terminated context, a is the context allowing the execution of action a (or rather any action obtained from a
through a substitution), operator + is used for non-deterministic choice, || is parallel composition, ; is sequential
composition, and D ∈ Def is the name of a definition of the kind D := C that should come with the context
specification (analogously e.g. to the agent definition operator in CCS). Whereas the context a can be considered
as the context executing action a on the environment, it can (and should) be dually considered also as the context
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allowing its associated agent to execute action a. Contexts are considered up to the congruence relation ≡ defined by
rules
0+ C ≡ C C + D ≡ D + C (C + D)+ C ′ ≡ C + (D + C ′)
0 ||C ≡ C C || D ≡ D ||C (C || D) ||C ′ ≡ C || (D ||C ′)
0;C ≡ C C; 0 ≡ C C; (D;C ′) ≡ (C; D);C ′
which describe the basic properties of the composition operators for choice, parallel, and sequences. Where
parenthesis are not used to disambiguate, we suppose that ; has priority over +, and + has priority over || .
As for processes, substitutions are allowed to propagate through contexts as well, with the following semantics:
σ0 , 0 σa , σ(a) σD , σ(D) σ (C + D) , σC + σD
σ(C || D) , σC || σD σ(C; D) , σC; σD.
Notice that a context name D is here considered as a term that can be subject to substitution just like actions.
Similarly to agents, a context evolves as actions are executed (by the agent over the environment, through the
ACC) and its continuation is affected by the corresponding substitution. Hence, contexts can be given an operational
semantics similarly to agents, by a transition system 〈C,−→C, A × Σ 〉 where −→C is defined by the rules:
a
a:σ−−→C 0
D := C C a:σ−−→C D
D a:σ−−→C D
C
a:σ−−→C C ′
C; D a:σ−−→C C ′; σD
C
a:σ−−→C C ′
C || D a:σ−−→C C ′ || D
C
a:σ−−→C C ′
C + D a:σ−−→C C ′
Apart from the basic rule for action execution, a definition name D behaves as the associated context, substitutions are
propagated to the sequential continuation, while choice and composition are managed as usual in process algebras.
Notice that this calculus for contexts degenerates to a fragment of CCS when the substitution system is the naive one
including only the identity.
The control/filtering/enabling activity of an ACC over an agent can be understood by defining the combined
behaviour of an agent wrapped by an ACC. Informally, the idea is that a process is coupled with a context, and
therefore the agent action a is allowed only if/when the context allows a comparable action b. On the one hand, the
context could allow a more general action b (an action that can be substituted into the agent’s), in which case a can be
directly executed over the environment. On the other hand, the context could allow a more specific action b, in which
case b is the action that will be executed over the environment. Notice that differently from the algebra from process
described before, we here equip the ACC algebra with other operators – sequential and parallel composition, as well
as (recursive) definitions – in order to obtain a fully featured specification tool.
A new labelled transitions system 〈A,−→A, A × Σ 〉 is introduced to describe the behaviour of an agent controlled
by an ACC, where elements of A are of the kind 〈P,C〉— agent state P with ACC in state C . The transition relation
is defined by the rule:
P
σP(a):σC◦σE−−−−−−−→P Q C σC(a):σP◦σE−−−−−−−→C D
〈P,C〉 σP◦σC(a):σE−−−−−−−→A 〈Q, D〉
In this rule, σP(a) represents the action the agent is willing to execute, σC(a) the action allowed by the context
specification, and σE is the substitution imposed by the environment. As a result, σP ◦ σC(a) = σC(σP(a)) is the
action actually executed over the environment, to which substitution σE is then imposed. This rule is at the core of
our formal approach to deal with ACCs enabling/filtering/controlling behaviour, and fully exploit the idea that our
generalised notions of actions and substitutions uniformly support both value-passing and action patterns.
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As an example, assume the LINDA substitution system described in previous section, and consider the simple ACC
specification D defined as
D := (in(id, t (X, Y, 1)); out(id, t (X, Y, 1))
meaning that after retrieving a tuple of the kind t (X, Y, 1) the same tuple must be reinserted by an out. Now consider
the three different agent behaviours
in(id, t (X, Y, Z)); out(id, t (X, Y, Z))
in(id, t (3, Y, 1)); out(id, t (3, Y, 1))
in(id, t (3, Y, Z)); out(id, t (3, Y, Z))
and the case where the environment imposes the substitution necessary to retrieve tuple t (3, 2, 1). Each of the three
agent exemplifies one of the following three scenarios, orderly:
• Narrowing context — The first agent is willing to retrieve any tuple of the form t (X, Y, Z) from tuple space
id, but the context only allows for the narrowed version t (X, Y, 1). According to the above rules, we have
a = in(id, t (X, Y, Z)), σP = I and σC = {Z/1}, hence the environment receives a request for action
in(id, t (X, Y, 1)). As a result, the substitution imposed by the environment is σE = {X/3, Y/2}.
• Widening context — The second agent is willing to retrieve tuples of the kind t (3, Y, 1) from tuple space id,
and the context allows for any tuple t (X, Y, 1). We have the reversed situation with respect to the above one,
where a = in(id, t (X, Y, Z)), σP = {X/3} and σC = I, hence the environment receives a request for action
in(id, t (3, Y, 1)). As a result, the substitution imposed by the environment is σE = {Y/2}.
• Overlapping context—The second agent is willing to retrieve tuples of the kind t (3, Y, Z) from tuple space id, and
the context allows for any tuple t (X, Y, 1). The two actions cannot be directly substituted one by the other— rather,
a unification-like mechanism is to be applied, such that a = in(id, t (X, Y, Z)), σP = {X/3} and σC = {Z/1},
hence the environment receives a request for action in(id, t (3, Y, 1)). As a result, the substitution imposed by the
environment is σE = {Y/2}.
In all the above three cases, σE ◦σP ◦σC(a) = in(id, t (3, 2, 1)), so that the next action request for all the three agents
is out(id, t (3, 2, 1)).
4.4. Enacting integrated security and coordination policies by ACCs
In this section we show that the ACC language is simple, yet powerful enough to describe and govern agent
accesses to the resources in the environment. On the one hand, this description concerns security aspects, defining
the restrictions that an agent is subject to when interacting with the environment through the ACC. On the other
hand, an ACC is dually used also to represent how an agent has to interact in order to fruitfully exploit the available
resources, which seemingly concerns coordination aspects. Interestingly enough, as the ACC is used in practical cases,
the distinction between these two viewpoints fades, and the ACC is more easily to be interpreted as an abstraction
that enacts integrated security and coordination policies in a conceptually clean and coherent way. Clearly, to gain
this expressiveness, the language features we borrowed from deeply-studied foundational calculi for interaction play
a crucial role.
Filtering
The basic security policy that our language for contexts should be able to specify is the ability of discerning which
actions over the environment are admissible and which are not. Notice that this is the typical approach to security of
systems based on access control lists (ACL): once an agent has been authenticated – in our framework, once it has
successfully negotiated an ACC – it can only access a subset of the available resources. A general definition of the
kind
D := (a1 + a2 + · · · + an);D
implements the idea: the context expressed byD can indefinitely execute any action ai , whereas others are not allowed.
Hence, the choice operator + is used to enable a subset of actions, while sequential composition along with the
recursive definition D is used to iterate this behaviour indefinitely. In fact, any sequence of the actions a1, . . . , an is
an allowed history of the context D.
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Moreover, substitutions allow us to filter the allowed actions more flexibly. Suppose the ACC is used to regulate
the access to a tuple space living in the agent environment. By the specification
D := (out(id, t (X, 1))+ in(id, t (X, 1))+ rd(id, t (X, 1)));D
the ACC allows only tuples of the kind t (X, 1) to be inserted, read, and removed from the tuple space id. Notice
that since the definition name D is a term without variables, substitutions never make into a recursive definition:
after inserting tuple t (1, 1) the substitution is not propagated to the successive action, hence the agent can later insert
t (2, 1). On the other hand, by the definitions
D := (out(id, t (X, 1))+ in(id, t (X, 1))+ rd(id, t (X, 1)));D′(X)
D′(X) ::= (out(id, t (X, 1))+ in(id, t (X, 1))+ rd(id, t (X, 1)));D′(X)
an ACC specified by D binds variable X to a value once and for all at the first action: after inserting t (1, 1) the only
tuple that can be later removed is t (1, 1), since invocation D′(1) is actually iterated.
Protocols
The mechanisms of ACLs is indeed a static one: the subset of allowed actions is determined after authentication,
and is typically not changed thereafter. Instead, our language is sufficiently powerful to enable the idea of protocol,
that is, to impose the sequence in which an agent can perform actions. For instance, by the context D defined by
D := (a1 + a2); (a3 + a4); a5
the agent is allowed to execute only three actions, the first being a1 or a2, the second a3 or a4, the last a5. In general,
by the operators + and ; a context can specify any finite subsequence of actions as being allowed, such as e.g.
D := (a1 + a2; a3)+ a1; a1; (a2 + a3)
and so on.
Indeed, the ability of expressing dynamic control of interaction is crucial to make coordination policies enter the
picture, and thus to express how an agent has to interact with a resource to obtain given services while preserving
the integrity and safety of resources. For instance, the basic mechanisms of sequential composition and choice can be
fruitfully exploited along with recursive definitions and substitutions, as in the following LINDA case:
D ::= in(id, t (X, 1)); out(id, t (X, 1));D.
The contextD not only specifies that the agent should alternatively consume and write tuples of the kind t (X, 1), but by
means of the substitution mechanism it forces the agent to insert the same tuple just after its removal. For instance, one
can easily verify that while the sequence of actions 〈in(id, t (1, 1)), out(id, t (1, 1)), in(id, t (2, 1)), out(id, t (2, 1))〉
is allowed by the context, 〈in(id, t (1, 1)), out(id, t (2, 1))〉 is not. This kind of specification is particularly relevant
when the occurrence of a tuple in a tuple space is used to mean that a resources is available: using such a protocol
would ensure that agents release the resource(s) used before accessing others.
Fine-grained policies
Besides basic mechanisms for filtering admissible actions and enforcing protocols, our language makes it possible
a finer-grained tuning of the access policy to the entities living in the environment. The corresponding specifications
turn out be quite expressive, allowing to integrate access control policies for the resource and concurrency aspects of
the individual agent interactions, thus seamlessly integrating security and coordination aspects.
As a first example, suppose that executing an action is used for representing an access to a resource. In this case, it
may be sensible to limit the amount of actions that an agent may execute: the composition operator || can be exploited
to this end. By the context D defined as
D ::= a1 || a1 || a1 || a2 || a3
an agent can invoke a1 at most three times, a2 and a3 only once, in whichever order.
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When this mechanism is used along with protocols, it can be exploited to allow an agent to participate in more
simultaneous conversations of the same protocol. The LINDA example shown above can be extended as
D ::= (in(id, t (X, 1)); out(id, t (X, 1))) ||D
allowing the agent to exploit resources simultaneously. In this case, even though the agent is not required to release
a resource before using another, it still cannot insert tuples that it had not removed, which at least ensures mutually-
exclusive accesses.
Dynamic controls and non-determinism
An interesting subtlety comes in when interpreting the meaning of the choice operator in contexts. Consider a
context of the kind a1;C1+· · ·+ an;Cn , with all ai distinct from each other. This context allows the agent to execute
any action ai , and correspondingly, the context continuation Ci carries on. As a result, in this case the agent makes a
deterministic choice through the context.
On the other hand, the situation is different when the ai are not all distinct. By a context of the kind a;C + a; D,
after executing the action a the context may be either move to state C or D, independently from the interaction with
the agent. An interesting interpretation of this case is that by a non-deterministic choice the infrastructure is able to
dynamically control the shape and behaviour of an ACC during its run-time. In a sense, the agent interaction histories
allowed by the ACC security policy are not completely determined once and for all after the negotiation, but can be
subsequently influenced by the coordination infrastructure, depending on run-time aspects such as the availability of
resources. As an example, consider the generic definition:
D ::= (start; resource(r)+ start; resource(s);D)
each time the agent wants to access a resource, it first executes the initialising action start, then the infrastructure
through the ACC decides which resource between r and s is to be made available to the agent, and correspondingly
drives the choice. Another interesting case is related to the LINDA protocol mentioned above. This variation of it:
D ::= in(id, t (X, 1)); out(id, t (X, 1))+ in(id, t (X, 1)); out(id, t (X, 1));D
makes it possible for the infrastructure to decide that a given ACC is to be finished. In fact, at the time the tuple is
removed by the invocation of primitive in, the context may either choose to make it be the latter (left choice), or to
allow new ones thereafter (right choice). All these applications show the intrinsic dual and integrated nature of an
ACC specification of security and coordination policies.
4.5. Properties
The basic property of our model of ACCs is that the behaviour resulting from the composition of an agent with
its ACC can be considered as a refinement of the behaviour admitted by the ACC itself, and similarly, it is also a
refinement of the behaviour of the agent alone. As a result, since the ACC can be seen as added to the usual case
where the agent directly interacts with the environment, the ACC can be interpreted as acting as a constrainer for the
agent, enabling only a predefined subset of behaviours.
More precisely, consider trace semantics as the observation semantics for our labelled transition systems [37],
which uses the multiset of all the admissible histories of interactions as a system observable behaviour.3 In particular,
the atomic constituents of any agent interaction history are elements of the form a : σ — action a involving
substitution σ . Let P be an agent state andC its initial context. Let βP,C be the observable behaviour of the agent when
interacting with the environment through the context, βC,P the observable behaviour of the context when controlling
the agent, βP,E the observable behaviour of the agent when directly interacting with the environment, and βC,E the
observable behaviour of the context when interacting with the environment alone (or equivalently, controlling an agent
exhibiting any trace of actions).
3 Our discussion could be more general by relying on a finer observation semantics, such as bisimulation. However, we stick to trace semantics
to ease the understanding of our semi-formal presentation.
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To reason about the relationship between these behaviours, we extend the notion of behaviour refinement as
traditionally defined for process algebras [37]: according to trace semantics, the behaviour of a process P is a particular
case of another Q – i.e. P a refinement of Q – when P’s histories are included into Q’s. We denote by β τ β ′ when
the behaviour β is a trace-refinement of β ′. We also denote by β 'Σ β ′ when the behaviour β is equivalent to β ′
modulo substitution, that is, when both
∀〈. . . , ai : σi , . . .〉 ∈ β, ∃〈. . . , a′i : σ ′i , . . .〉 ∈ β ′ s.t.∀i, σi (ai ) = σ ′i (a′i )
and
∀〈. . . , a′i : σ ′i , . . .〉 ∈ β ′, ∃〈. . . , ai : σi , . . .〉 ∈ β s.t.∀i, σi (ai ) = σ ′i (a′i ).
The main property of our formal framework is expressed by the following diagram:
βP,C
τ←−−−− βP,E
'Σ
∥∥∥
βC,P
τ←−−−− βC,E
where arrows go from a behaviour to a refinement of it. The upper arrow means that any context acts as a constrainer to
the interactive behaviour of an agent, this sub-property being here referred to as soundness, that is, no new behaviour
is added by adding a context. The lower arrow means that the behaviour obtained by using a context along with an
agent is always a refinement of that specified by the context, which we here refer to as security: after the behaviour of a
context is declared as secure, the effects of an agent on the environment is automatically secured. The left equivalence
means that when coupling an agent and a context, the context’s behaviour is equivalent (modulo substitution) to the
process’ one, this property referred to as preservation: when an agent performs an action allowed by the context, then
the agent is ensured that this (and only this) is actually performed on the environment as well. The proof of these
properties is actually a simple, direct consequence of the structure of transition relation −→A (and the equivalent ones
where only agents and contexts are respectively taken into account). Notice that in the case the framework sticks to
the version without value-passing, that is, when the substitution system only includes the identities, the left arrow
becomes the equality relation.
In an open scenario, where almost nothing about an agent internal architecture may be known at design-time –
and hence, little is known about its actual interactive behaviour – the management of ACCs ensures two different, yet
related benefits. On the one hand, agent interactions with the environment can be confined to only those behaviours that
are secure according to the ACC policy. On the other hand, this model simplifies reasoning about system behaviour:
even in open systems, there is no need to worry about which behaviour will be manifested by upcoming unknown
agents, given that one can safely stick to the ACC — the actual agent behaviour being a particular case of it. In
particular, this framework shows the potential for extending reasoning and automatic verification of properties from
closed to open scenarios.
5. ACC as an abstraction for MAS design
The agent abstraction is particularly useful not merely to describe a single agent behaviour, but rather the behaviour
of an agent immersed in an environment with other agents and resources. As up to now we only took into account
the relationship between an agent and its ACC, we now consider agents and ACCs as belonging to a complete MAS.
There, ACCs can be seen as infrastructural means to specify and enact security/coordination policies in a MAS. To
this end, we focus on the structure of an agent environment, and we suppose it is populated by two kinds of entity:
other agents, each with its own ACC, and coordination artifacts as introduced in [22]. These are meant to represent
the two basic interaction approaches in the MAS field: (i) direct communication between agents, which is the more
standard approach [38], and (ii) mediated interaction, where interaction occurs through the environment and relies on
infrastructures that support forms of coordination/cooperation without direct communication [20,39,40]. In particular,
coordination artifacts are introduced to act as mediating abstractions, governing the interactions between the many
agents of a MAS. In spite coordination artifacts come equipped by remarkable features such as usage interface,
operating instructions, malleability, and inspectability [22], which are at the core of the engineering methodology
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they promote [41], we stick here to their coordination medium nature [19]. In particular, coordination artifacts are
simply seen as components upon which agents of the MAS can execute actions, and get coordinated.
Accordingly, in this section we first provide a formal account of how agents interact with other agents or with
coordination artifacts through ACCs, and then provide examples of ACC specifications used to design direct and
indirect interaction scenarios for MASs.
5.1. Direct and indirect interaction
Let S be the set of system configurations, representing the distributed state of the MAS of interest. Each element
S ∈ S is seen here as a parallel composition of agents (each with its own ACC) and coordination artifacts, expressed
by syntax:
S ::= 0 | 〈P,C〉 | 〈M〉 | S || S.
A term 〈M〉 represents a coordination medium in state M , and “ || ” is the operator for parallel composition — which
is supposed to be commutative and associative.
We take into account peer-interaction between agents by the correspondence relation FG of the action substitution
system— addressing the issue in a way mostly similar to those of process calculi such as CCS and pi -calculus. a FG b
means that action a of an agent is coupled with action b of another agent: if this is the case the two agents can execute
the two actions thus synchronising through them. Considering the CCS-like substitution system described in previous
section, for instance, the correspondence relation is defined as the smallest satisfying rules:
!n(u) FG?n(v) !n(u) FG?n(u).
Namely, sending a value gets synchronised with the corresponding action of receiving that value or receiving any
value, through the same channel.
Direct interaction between two agents is then naturally expressed by the operational rule:
〈P,C〉 a:σ−−→A 〈Q, D〉 〈P ′,C ′〉 b:σ
′−−→A 〈Q′, D′〉 σ(a) FG σ ′(b)
〈P,C〉 || 〈P ′,C ′〉 || S −→S 〈Q, D〉 || 〈Q′, D′〉 || S
.
This rule simply states that for two agents to directly interact, two substitutions must exist which make the two actions
correspond to each other. The natural intuition behind this idea is that one action represents sending information,
while the other represents receiving that information, even though more complex cases could also be considered and
modelled.4 Indirect interaction is instead taken into account by allowing an agent to interact with a coordination
artifact. To this end, we suppose that the latter evolves by interactions of the usual kind a : σ , meaning that action a
is allowed by enforcing substitution σ . Thus, the rule for indirect interaction is represented as:
〈P,C〉 a:σ−−→A 〈Q, D〉 〈M〉 a:σ−−→M 〈M ′〉
〈P,C〉 || 〈M〉 || S −→S 〈Q, D〉 || 〈M ′〉 || S
.
In particular, transition relation −→M is here used to mask the internal behaviour of the coordination artifact, which
can be conceived according to any coordination model and independently of its complexity. That is, on coordination
media we simply suppose that their transition relation is of the kind −→M ⊆ M × F × M as for relation −→P, without
any further description of the structure of set M , for it is unnecessary.
Whereas the interaction between an agents and a coordination artifacts appears symmetrical, the semantics of
agent interaction reveals that substitution σ is an input to the agent transition, which is meant to be provided by the
coordination artifact, as also emphasised in the following examples.
4 The reader should not confuse direct interaction with synchrony: in spite we endorse a synchronous viewpoint over agent interactions,
asynchrony could also be taken into account using e.g. the approach of asynchronous pi -calculus, without however impacting our discussion
on ACCs.
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5.2. Example of direct interaction
To show an application of ACC specification to a typical MAS scenario involving direct communication, we
consider the case of the contract-net protocol [33]. An initiator agent is bringing about the execution of an action
but has not the necessary knowledge or competence, therefore, it issues a call for proposals to a number of participant
agents. These agents should reply either with a proposal or with a refusal: the initiator sends an acceptance message
to a subset of the proposing agents, in which case each of them will provide a reply back to him— a positive one with
a result of the action execution or a failure.
We suppose that the initiator id i has an ACC enabling contract-net conversations with a set of participants
id p1 , . . . , id
p
k , and that each participant has an ACC for enabling participation to the contract-net conversations
initiated by id i . As substitution system, we consider an hybrid of CCS and LINDA-style tuple matching seen in
previous section: actions represent sending and receiving terms through a channel, where a term may include variables
to be bound at reception — possibly containing a channel name as in pi -calculus. In particulars, actions are expressed
by syntax
a ::= n!t (w1, . . . , wk) | n?t (w1, . . . , wk)
orderly representing sending or receiving term t (w1, . . . , wk) through channel n. Defining the details of the
corresponding substitution system does not introduce any new clue and is quite intuitive, thus it is not reported for
brevity.
We suppose the existence of k channels n1, . . . , nk , each assigned to a different participant. The ACC specification
for the initiator is defined as the process Di , given the definitions:
Di ::= D′i (x);Di
D′i (x) ::= Di p(n1, x) || . . . ||Di p(nk, x)
Di p(n, x) ::= n!cfp(x); (
n?refuse+
n?proposal(p); (
n!reject-proposal+
n!accept-proposal; (
n?failure( f )+
n?inform-result(r)+
n?inform-done(d)
)))
Each definition D′i (x) handles a contract-net conversation for the topic x : each such conversation is then managed
sequentially due to the recursive definition of Di . D′i (x) is defined as the parallel composition of the parts dealing with
each different participant (Di p). In particular, for each of them the call-for-proposals (cfp) is first sent, which can be
refused (refuse) or accepted formulating a proposal with content p ( proposal(p)). Proposals can be rejected (reject-
proposal) or accepted (accept-proposal): in the latter case the participant can either fail to execute the intended action
( failure(f)), inform about the result (inform-result(r)), or inform when the action has been executed (inform-done(d)).
Dually, the specification of the ACC for the participant is defined as process Dp(n) where n is the channel name,
and given the definition:
Dp(n) ::= n?cfp(x); (
n!refuse+
n!proposal(p); (
n?reject-proposal+
n?accept-proposal; (
n!failure( f )+
n!inform-result(r)+
n!inform-done(d)
)));Dp(n)
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This example should emphasise a key property of the framework developed so far: independently of the complexity
and of the degree of autonomy and openness of the agents, the notion of ACC allows the designer (i) to enforce
finely tuned access control policies, (ii) to ease agent deliberation during the cooperation, and (iii) to statically
verify soundness properties of protocols. In particular, the last aspect amounts to isolate a crucial aspect of the MAS
behaviour inside infrastructural abstractions (the ACCs), which become amenable to a complete formal specification.
For the case of direct interaction, this means to consider as abstract model for the MAS evolution the simple
composition of the ACCs of the involved agents.
5.3. Example of indirect interaction
We study also the case of indirect interaction, where a coordination artifact mediates the interactions of different
agents, thus playing a crucial role in the MAS society. We consider a coordination scenario known as the query-if
problem [38], where agents can play one of two roles, as either (i) client agents, willing to receive information about
the validity of a formula, representing e.g. some knowledge, or (ii) server agents, willing to provide information about
the validity of a formula. However, we suppose agents live in an environment where, e.g. because of an intrinsic
openness and heterogeneity, they do not know about each other’s existence: they only perceive the existence of a
coordination artifact where requests or replies can be posted that are automatically served. From a design viewpoint,
this MAS behaviour is conceived by providing the ACC specification for the client and server roles, and by defining
the behaviour of the coordination artifact.
We first suppose that the set of actions is defined by syntax
ρ ::= ok | neg
a ::= idc!ask(φ) | ids !get(φ) | ids !ρ(φ) | idc?ρ
and the ACCs for the two roles are Dc and Ds for client and server, defined as:
Dc(idc) ::= idc!ask(φ); (idc?pos + idc?neg);Dc(idc)
Ds(ids) ::= ids !get(φ); (Ds(ids)+ (ids !pos(φ)+ ids?neg(φ));Ds(ids)).
A client asks for the validity of formula φ by action idc!ask(φ), and perceives a positive or negative reply by being
able to complete either action idc?pos or idc?neg; this protocol is then iterated sequentially. On the other hand, a
server retrieves information about queried formulae matching the template φ by action ids !get(φ): as the substitution
σ is yielded, σφ denotes the formula to be checked. The server has then three possibilities, (i) ignore the request
(e.g. because no information on the topic is available) and iterate the invocation to Ds , (ii) reply positively by action
ids !pos(φ) or (iii) negatively by ids !neg(φ). In the last two cases, notice that φ is no longer the template, but is the
actual formula bound by the substitution σ .
The run-time behaviour of the coordination artifact is described by considering the following set of states (parallel
composition of pending actions)
M ::= 0 | a | M ||M
and the transition system:
〈M〉 idc!ask(φ):I−−−−−−−→M 〈M || idc!ask(φ)〉 [ASK]
〈M || idc!ask(σφ)〉 ids !get(φ):σ−−−−−−→M 〈M || idc!ask(σφ)〉 [GET]
〈M || idc!ask(φ)〉 ids !ρ(φ):I−−−−−−→M 〈M || idc?ρ〉 [TELL]
〈M || idc?ρ〉 idc?ρ:I−−−−→M 〈M〉 [REP].
Rule [ASK] says that any request by a client is accepted by the artifact, stored in its space, and replied by the identity
substitution. Rule [GET] says that the request for a formula by a server is accepted only if that formula substitutes
into a pending one, thus involving the corresponding substitution. Rule [TELL] admits a reply by a server only if the
corresponding client request still occurs – namely, it was not previously served – in which case an answer ρ for the
client is prepared. Finally, rule [REP] makes this answer to be perceived by the client agent.
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In this new example, notice that the abstract model of MAS behaviour is composed by the two ACC specifications
and the coordination artifact behaviour, which are all infrastructural abstractions coming with a formal and operational
model.
6. Related works and conclusions
MAS are complex software systems typically featuring distribution, openness, heterogeneity and unpredictability.
By focusing on MAS, in this paper we discuss the notion of Agent Coordination Context (ACC) as an organisational
abstraction that addresses both coordination and security issues, covers the whole engineering process from design-
time to run-time, and is amenable of a clear formalisation. In particular, in this paper we discussed a formal framework
for reasoning about the ACC behaviour, exploiting standard process algebra techniques to define a new language for
specifying and enacting integrated security/coordination policies in MAS.
While our approach considers access control in terms of security policies that may be dynamically established
and enforced at run-time, other approaches only stick to their static, design-time aspects. An example is the work in
[42], later evolved into the KLAIM model [43], where agents are given a type much in the same way as in typed
programming languages. This type system is meant to characterise a mobile agent intention to access LINDA tuple
spaces residing on different localities, then supporting compile-time verification of soundness — i.e., safe access to
resources. The Secure Object Space model in [44] is based on the idea of associating a symmetric of asymmetric key
to any item of the shared dataspace (tuples or objects), by which an agent may be allowed or not to access such items.
SecSpaces [45] develops this idea by including also logical partition of shared tuple spaces as a means to control
access, also discriminating between primitives for tuple reading and removal.
With respect to existing proposals, the ACC approach, by moving security out of the scope of the coordination
model toward organisation, allows for tackling security issues in a uniform way within different coordination models,
without requiring their extension. For instance, the TuCSoN infrastructure for MAS coordination has been enhanced
with ACCs with no need to either modify or extend the underlying coordination model based on tuple centres [46].
The ACC framework shares some visions and objectives with policy-driven architectures [47], developed mostly
in the context of distributed systems. These approaches typically make it possible to define explicitly organisation
policies – typically role-based – ruling objects interaction and process access to resources inside a distributed system.
In this context, the notion of ACC is similar to the notion of controller as found in the Law Governed Interaction (LGI)
model [48]. Generally speaking, LGI is a message-exchange mechanism that allows an open group of distributed
agents to engage in a mode of interaction governed by an explicitly specified and strictly enforced policy, the
interaction law of the group. Law enforcement is decentralised, and carried out by a distributed set of controllers, one
for each member of the community. As the LGI controller, the ACC enforces rules constraining the action/perception
space of the agent exploiting it, enabling the enactment of policy that are local to the agent. In our approach however,
global coordination policies – meant to model laws concerning the society as a whole, not related to specific agent
actions but to the global agent interaction space – are more properly embedded and enforced by coordination media
(such as tuple centres [31]). Also, ACCs are dynamically negotiated, and the negotiation is governed by rules defined
at run-time by the organisation; in the LGI model, instead, controllers appear to be statically given to agents, without
any explicit support at a model level for their dynamic and controlled retrieval.
In general, the application of the notion of ACC (along with the language introduced here) to the design,
deployment, and design-/run-time verification of complex, open and distributed systems is the main line of
development of this research. From the security viewpoint, it would be interesting to evaluate the applicability and the
impact of the ACC notion not only on access control, but also on authentication and secrecy.
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